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Jonathon W. Penney* Deciding in the Heat of the
Constitutional Moment: Constitutional
Change in the Quebec Secession
Reference
The Quebec Secession Reference addressed divisive issues with far-reaching
implications for the Canadian constitutional order Recently, commentators have
called for a less traditional and more systematic approach to understanding the
decision, and its place in the broader scheme of Canadian constitutionalism.
Accordingly, this paper challenges the predominant narrative concerning the
Quebec Secession Reference, which is largely judge-centred and shows little
regard for the important historical, political, and popular forces so crucial to
understanding the decision. The challenge is mounted through the work of Yale
constitutional scholar Bruce Ackerman and his theory of constitutional moments.
This paper uses Ackerman's criteria of higher-lawmaking and constitutional
moments - signalling, proposal, mobilized popular deliberation and synthesis
- as an analytical framework to advance a new understanding of the Supreme
Courts decision. The author argues that the events surrounding the decision fit
Ackerman s criteria fora "constitutional moment" and demonstrate that key aspects
of the constitutional doctnne introduced in the decision - in particular the much
heralded "duty to negotiate" - were shaped more by political and popular forces
than by the Court itself. In exploring the implications of this analysis, the author
re-assesses the academic commentary on the decision and recommends a new
dialogical theory of constitutional adudication that considers not just the courts and
Parliament, but also the role of popular and political forces in constitutional change
Le Renvoi relatif 6 la secession du Quebec traite de questions fort controversees
ayant des incidences tres profondes pour rordre constitutionnel canadlen.
Les commentateurs ont recemment plaid6 en faveur d'une approche moins
traditionnelle et plus systematique pour la comprehension de I'arr6t et de sa place
dans une vaste perspective du syst~me constitutionnel canadien. Par cons6quent,
cet article conteste le point de vue purement descnptif concernant le Renvoi
relatif i la secession du Quebec, lequel est fortement ax6 sur la vision des juges
et n'accorde que peu dimportance aux grands courants histonques, politiques et
populaires pourtant essentiels I la comprehension de la decision. La contestation
s appuie sur les travaux de Bruce Ackerman, specialiste constitutionnel de
I'universitd Yale, et sur sa throne des - moments constituants -. L'auteur
prend comme point de depart les criteres de creation des lois par des entit6s
souveraines et de - moments constituants. enonc6s par Ackerman - transmission
du message, d6liberations populaires mobilisees et synth se - en tant que cadre
d'analyse pour suggerer une nouvelle Interpretation de 'arrt de la Cour supreme.
L'auteur pretend que les dvenements entourant la decision satisfont aux criteres
de moment constitutif - proposes par Ackerman et demontrent que les aspects
cls de la doctrine constitutionnelle compns dans la decision - en particulier
r1obligation de negocier dont on parle tant - ont 60 fagonnds plus par des forces
politiques et populaires que par la Cour meme. Tout en 6tudiant les incidences
de cette analyse, 'auteur redivalue la doctrine relative 6 1'arr~t et recommande
une nouvelle thdorie dialogique d'adjudication constitutionnelle qui prend en
considdration non seulement les tribunaux et le Parlement, mais 6galement le
rdle des forces populaires et politiques dans le changement constitutionnel.
* LLB (Dalhousie, 2003) and presently counsel with the Justice Department. The opinions
expressed in this paper are the personal opinions of the author. The author thanks Ronalda Murphy,
Philip Girard, and the anonymous reviewer for their advice on early drafts of this paper.
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In the Quebec Secession Reference' the Supreme Court of Canada
addressed di\ isive issues with far-reaching implications for the Canadian
constitutional order.' Not surprisingly, the decision resulted in an avalanche
of criticism and commentary. Yet, the vast majority of this commentary
has focused mainly on the Court, debating the justices' motivations, legal
I. Referei,'c rt 'tttuin of Quchct. [1998] 2 S.CR. 217 [Quebec Secession Reference].
2. In the words of the Supreme Court, it had been asked to address "momentous questions that go
t,, the heart of our system of constitutional gos emment." See Quebec Secession Reference. supra note
I at 227.
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justifications and politics.3 Recently, howe% er, commentators have called
for a less traditional and more systematic approach to understanding
the decision. and its place in the broader scheme of Canadian
constitutionalism.
4
Accordingly. this paper challenges the predominant narrative
concerning the Quebec Secession Rtlerence, which is largely judge-centred
and shows little regard for the important historical, political, and popular
forces so crucial to understanding the decision. The challenge is mounted
through the work of American scholar Bruce Ackerman and his theory of
constitutional moments.' Like Sanford Levinson, I think Ackerman is one
of the most important modem theorists of constitutional change." I also
agree with Levinson that w\hile Ackerman's work is primarily concerned
w ith theAmerican experience, its structured framework can help understand
constitutional development in other countries. In addition to Ackerman's
criteria for constitutional moments, this paper will draw upon his analysis
of constitutional change during the Newv Deal period in American history
for comparative purposes.
There are, of course. problems % ith using a theory based on unique
aspects of American history to discuss Canadian constitutionalism. Still,
Ackerman's historical approach to constitutionalism provides a "bridge"
between Canadian and American traditions, as his theory has been likened
to the "living tree" doctrine of constitutional development so prominent
in Canada."
3. Professors Choudhry and Ho%% se have documented a substantial portion of the commentary and
noted its traditional focus on the court and the ray, political consequences of the decision. See Sujit
Choudhry & Robert Howse, "Constitutional Theory and the Quebec Secession Reference" (2001) 13
Can. J. L. & Juri'. 143 at 143-145 ["Choudhr"].
4. Ibid. at 144-145.
5. The conception of the thcor' u.cd here is discussed in: Bruce Ackerman, l the People:
Foundations (Cambridge: Harvard'Unisersity Press, 1991) [Foundations], Bruce Ackerman, We the
People: Transformations (Cambridge: Harard Unisersity Press, 1998) [Transformations]; Bruce
Ackerman, "Higher Lawmaking." in S. Lev inson, ed., Responding to Imperfection: Theor. and
Practice of Consitutional Amendment (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1995) ["Imperfection"];
Bruce Ackerman, "'Reolution on a Human Scale" (1999) 108 Yale L.J. 2279 ["Reolution"]; and
Bruce Ackerman, "Symposium: Fidelity in Constitutional Theory: Fidelity as Synthesis: A Generation
of Betrayal?" (1997) 101 Fordham L. Rev. 1519 ["Fidelity"].
6. See Sanford Levinson. "Transitions" (1999) 1(18 Yale L.J. 2215 at 2215-2216 ["Transitions"].
7. Ibid. at 2215-2216.
8. See Michael Les Benedict, 'Constitutional History and Constitutional Theory: Reflections on
Ackerman, Reconstruction, and the Transformation of the American Constitution" (19991 108 Yale
U. 2011 at 2012 ["Benedict"]. Benedict links the term "living Constitution" to a 1927 article by
Howard Lee McBain. In Canada, the "living tree" metaphor for constitutional development is most
often attributed to Lord Sankey in the famous "persons" constitutional decision in Edwards : Attorney-
General for Canada, [1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.) at 136 [Edwards].
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Ackerman also presents normative arguments supporting the form
of constitutional change he identifies.' This paper is not concerned with
these arguments for the most part. It is aimed at understanding how new
constitutional commitments-that is, new understandings as to what a
constitution provides, obliges or prohibits-are shaped outside the courts,
rather than any normative project of justification. 0 That said, this paper
does conclude with some normative concerns about the constitutional
change identified.
Accordingly, this paper uses Ackerman's criteria of "higher
lawmaking," and "constitutional moments"- signaling, proposal, mobilized
popular deliberation and synthesis - as an analytical framework to advance
a new understanding of the Quebec Secession Reference. I argue that the
events surrounding the decision, for the most part, can be understood to
involve a "constitutional moment" and conclude that key aspects of the
constitutional doctrine introduced in the decision - in particular the much
heralded "duty to negotiate" - N ere shaped more by political and popular
forces than by the Court itself.
Part II involves a general elaboration of the theory of constitutional
moments. For Ackerman, the New Deal era under President Franklin D.
Roosevelt marked the last great time of revolutionary change in American
constitutionalism. I demonstrate how his theory explains the events of the
New Deal in terms of constitutional change, including the role of the United
States Supreme Court. This discussion, in Part III, plays a comparative
role in analyzing the Quebec Secession Reference.
Drawing upon the insights of Ackerman's theory, I argue in Part IV
that the Quebec Secession Reference can be understood as part of a broad
constitutional moment occurring within Canada at the time. I suggest that,
like the "Old Court" under President Roosevelt, the decision involved a
"switch in time"" by the Supreme Court of Canada, wherein the Court
9. Eg.. see chapter "Why Dualism?" in Foundations. supra note 5 at 295-322; Imperfection. supra
note 5 at 66. Others have distinguished between Ackerman's descriptive and prescriptive arguments
including Michael J. Klarman, "Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce
Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments" (1992) 44 Stan. L. Rev. 759; Robert J. Lipkin,"Can
American Constitutional Law Be Post Modem?" (I)94) 42 Buffalo L. Re%. 317; Roger M. Smith,
"Legitimating Reconstruction: The Limits of Legal Realism" (1999) 108 Yale L.J. 2075; Sanford
Lcainson. "Transitions" supra note 6; and more recently., Mark Tushnet, The New Constitutional
Order (Princeton: Princeton Unisersity Press. 2003).
10. 1 should here note that my views on this point has e been deeply influenced by the work of Mark
Tushnet and his scholarship on understanding how constitutional meaning is articulated outside the
courtroom and aa hether examining these meanings is a wortha hile project. See Mark Tushnet, Taking
the Convotution. ,wa From the Courts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) [Taking].
11. I take this term fr m Ackerman's work. For Ackerman, "switch in time" denotes a sudden shift
by an institutional actor (like a court) from a well-entrenched position (such as the constitutionality of
a law) to a completely opposite one. An example ofthis was the "switch in time" of the United States
Supreme Court during the Nea Deal period. See Foundations, supra note 5 at 48-50.
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began a reconstruction"2 of doctrine to accommodate a new constitutional
commitment largely defined by political parties and popular forces.
This analysis includes a demonstration of how the Court went about
synthesizing' the new constitutional commitments.
At the outset, I acknowledge that the Quebec Secession Reference
cannot be a constitutional moment in the exact sense Ackerman means.
This is because Ackerman's model contemplates a more drawn-out process
arising from popular movements and a series of erratic decisions from the
high court reconciling the ideas of the new movement with those of the old.
The events surrounding the Quebec Secession Reference will deviate from
Ackerman's model in various vays. Most importantly, I argue that the
constitutional politics and commitments ultimately codified in the Quebec
Secession Reference did not involve one single broad-based movement
like the New Deal, but rather involved articulations about constitutional
obligations from both political and popular sources.
I. Ackerman s Theori, qf Constitutional Moments
1. The Basic Framework
Bruce Ackerman has focused his studies on constitutionalism in America,
hoping to bridge its radical disjuncture between history, theory and
practice. 4 Ackerman's main contention is that courts have and should
recognize significant constitutional changes that do not satisfy the
formal amendment procedures laid out under Article V of the American
Constitution, when those changes arise out of a "constitutional moment"
characterized by widespread popular support among a mobilized citizenry."
A constitutional moment occurs when courts, in particular high courts,
recognize new constitutional politics proposed by popular forces and
reinterpret the constitution in ways consistent with the new commitments
of those politics.'6
In this way, constitutional interpretations as articulated by judges
maintain their legitimacy by being anchored in popular sovereignty.'7 For
12. See "Revolution," supra note 5 at 2334-2335.
13. 1 also take this term from Ackerman's w, ork, For Ackerman, -'synthesis" occurs when the courts
attempt to reconcile old doctrine with nev. constitutional politics. See Foundations, supra note 5 at
88-94, 267-268.
14. Foundations, supra note 5 at 6-7.
15. Foundations, supra note 5 at 6-7.
16. Foundations. supra note 5 at 86-94, 288-290.
17. Imperfection, supra note 5 at 81-87. As stated, Ackerman goes a long way to argue that
higher lawmaking and the informal constitutional amendments it produces is a preferable form of
constitutional change, mainly because it is rooted in popular sovereignty. Of course, this presumes
that popular sovereignty itself is a worthwhile goal.
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Ackennan, this model of change best reflects actual revolutionary changes
in American constitutionalism, including the important changes in the
constitutional commitments of the American people from the Founding
era to the Reconstruction and New Deal periods." This is his theory of
constitutional moments.
The theory works according to a "dualist" model of change.' 9 The
dualism within the constitutional system is "normal politics" and
"higher lawmaking."2  Most of the time a constitutional system works
in a state of "normal politics," characterized by apathy, stability and low
public participation.2 In contrast, "higher lawmaking" occurs during
rare constitutional moments when people become interested in grand
constitutional issues that challenge established doctrine, principle and
practice:
A constitutional moment signifies that one or another grouping
has managed to gain mass support for an invasion of the normally
unideological center of American politics. Such a moment cannot occur
without disrupting many political arrangements that have been shaped
by normal politicians for quite different reasons. As a consequence, the
rise of a constitutional moment tends to be a sudden affair-measured in
years, not decades. 2
During times of higher lawmaking, the public does not think selfishly,
but rather in grand, abstract terms, posing broad questions about "the
rights of citizens and the permanent interests of the community."23
Typically, higher lawmaking can be identified by an agenda or proposal
focused on national constitutional questions backed by popular support
and later recognized by political institutions such as government officials
and courts. 4
A constitutional moment occurs when political actors are successful
in bringing their reformist proposals to the -centre" of political life. The
18. Foundations, supra note 5 at 44-57. As will be seen later. I do not think the changes in Quebec
S'cession Reference amount to anything as significant as the doctrinal changes in those eras ofAmerican
constitutional history. That said, I believe there is something going on in the decision that resonates
,th Ackerman's analysis. Ackerman often de.cribes the changes in the different "constitutional
moments" in American constitutionalism in terms of "commitment" to various principles, whether
that is a commitment to equality rights (the Reconstruction) or activist government (New Deal). See
Revohmon, supra note 5 at 2327.
19. Foundations, supra note 5 at 5, 10-I1, 16.
20 Foundations, supra note 5 at 240, 273-274.
21. Foundations. ,upra note 5 at 234-235, 20 5.
22. See "Fidelity," supra note 5 at 152 1.
23. Foundations, supra note 5 at 24t0, 272-274.
24 Foundations, supra note 5 at 266-269.
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"moment" is important, hoN ever. in that the new ideas or proposals may
or may not become entrenched:
[A constitutional moment] is both a rare and important event. But it
should not be confused with the rise of" a new constitutional solution.
Once Americans begin to tbcus on the rising agenda, they may not find
any solution that meets with their sustained and considered support.
Pro\ isional legislative efforts to deal with emerging problems generate
a meaningless cycle as each set of election returns brings a new fad to
the fore."5
Thus, for Ackerman. the higher-lawmaking of the New Deal era of
American political history was an example of a successful constitutional
moment where Franklin Roosevelt and Democrats successfully promoted
their agenda in Congress with widespread popular support. The
constitutional moment was solidified with the famous "switch in time that
saved nine" wherein the United States Supreme Court, previously resistant
to New Deal policy, capitulated and accepted new constitutional politics
and commitments.2 6
In ff, The People: Foundations Ackerman breaks down higher
lawx making into criteria that can identif, moments of constitutional change:
(1) signaling, when the ideas or principles of a reformist movement have
sufficient support that "its reform agenda should be placed at the center of
sustained public scrutiny."" (2) proposal, where political actors such as a
president claim the mandate of the people and incorporate the reformist
agenda into particular policies or proposals; ' (3) mobilized popular
deliberation, when grand ideas find national deliberation, opposition and
discussion; -' and (4) legal codification, when a "'switch in time" occurs
where the new principles and ideas of the successful movement are
recognized by courts who begin a complex process of synthesis to reconcile
the new ideas with old doctrine." This is the secondary role high courts
play in Ackerman's scheme. While sometimes providing judgments that
provoke transformative change, most of the time courts enforce entrenched
principles during years of normal politics3 1 or synthesize existing principles
to accommodate new constitutional politics."
25. "Fidelity," supra note 5 at 1519-1520.
26. Foundations, supra note 5 at 47-50.
27. Foundations. supra note 5 at 266.
28. Foundations, supra note 5 at 268
29. Foundations. supra note 5 at 266.
30. Foundations. supra note 5 at 267-268.
31. Foundations. supra note 5 at 60, X6-87.
32. Foundations. supra note 5 at 88-94.
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Since Ackerman argues that significant constitutional amendments
may occur both inside and outside formal amendment procedures, the
Founding and Reconstruction eras of American history are in a sense
..easy," because both involved formal amendments under Article V and
easily demonstrate popular support to authorize the "higher lawmaking" of
those times.33 The revolutionary changes during the New Deal, however,
are important to Ackerman, because they involved changes outside of
formal amending procedures.34 Similarly, I believe the Quebec Secession
Riferrnc also involved important changes outside formal amendment
procedures of Part V of the Canadian Constitution. Thus, the changes
in American constitutionalism during the New Deal will be used as a
comparative 'constitutional moment."
2. Dominant Narratives and the .1h'th of Rediscover
An important implication of Ackerman's work has been to revise
dominant narratives regarding constitutional change and emphasize the role
of a mobilized citizenry in promoting and authorizing new constitutional
commitments:
[Tihe Constitution cannot be understood without recognizing that
Americans have. time and time again, successfully repudiated large
chunks of their past and transformed their higher law to express deep
changes in their political identities."
Indeed, in the first volume of his most influential work We the People:
Foundations, Ackerman derides what he sees as the predominant
understanding of American constitutional change, the judge-centred Myth
of Rediscoverv.36 This narrative holds that important changes in American
constitutionalism, from the Founding up to the New Deal, involved judicial
"rediscovery" of certain truths about American constitutionalism. For
example, under the Myth of Rediscovery, lawyers, judges and scholars
believe that the United States Supreme Court of the New Deal era was
correct in overruling Lochner v: New York, because that decision did not
use a correct reading of the Constitution. That is, in overruling Lochner,
the court rediscovered the true reading.
According to Ackerman, this account of American constitutional
history based on judicial rediscovery is "built on sand" and cannot stand
33 FI-or the same conclusions se:c Benedict, supra note 8 at 2012-2013. See also Michael W.
Mc(onnell, "The Forgotten Constitutional Moment" (14941 11 Const. Comm. 115 at 117-119
["McConnell"].
34 McConnell, ibid.
35. Transformations. supra note 5 at 5.
36 Fmndatims, v'upra note 5 at 41-44.
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up to measured historical scrutin\. " The true account of constitutional
development is not "judge-centred" but instead illustrates the important
role of the citizenry in generating and consenting to fundamental changes
in constitutional development. For Ackerman, in focusing on judicial
power and rediscov ery, this narrative denigrates the role these other forces
play in articulating new constitutional commitments."
Similarly, the predominant character of the commentary and treatment
of the Quebec Se'ce'ssion Reterencc' has been largely judge-centred -9 and,
as we will see, often demonstrates a form of the Myth of Rediscovery.40
Like Ackerman, I wish to challenge this dominant narrative and introduce
a new understanding of the Quebec Secession Reference through the
analytical framework of constitutional moments. Hopefully, it will be one
that better reflects the role of popular values of Canadians and political
deliberation of elected officials in shaping constitutional change. First,
however, I explore Ackerman's theory of constitutional moments in
more concrete terms, as it applies to the New Deal changes in American
constitutionalism. This will provide a valuable comparative tool in our
analysis of the Quebec Secession ReferctcV.
II. The New Deal as ai Constitutional .oment
Prior to the New Deal policies of the 1930s, courts in the United States
subscribed to the tenets of laissez-faire philosophy as reflected in
constitutional jurisprudence protecting freedom of contract and property."I
Even the Reconstruction amendments, such as the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
amendments, invoked the language of property, holding that blacks could
no longer be owned as chattels and, from then on, would be able to contract
their labour for their own benefit.42 This constitutional understanding based
on free markets and fundamental protections of property, as articulated
by the United States Supreme Court. vas not challenged until the 1930s,
when laissez-faire ideology would be repudiated by a popular President
and Congress dealing with the problems of the Great Depression."
37. Foundations. supra note 5 at 44.
38. Foundations, supra note 5 at 43-44.
39. Choudhry, supra note 3 at 143-144
40. In Part IV, I argue that Professors Choudhry and Howse expound a version of the Myth of
Rediscovery in their analysis of Quebec Secession Reference.
41. Foundations. supra note 5 at 100.
42. Foundations, supra note 5 at 100-101.
43. Foundations, supra note 5 at 100-101.
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1. Signalling and Proposal
It was in the 1930s that the American progressive movement was reborn.4
During this period, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his Congressional
Democrats were able to secure repeated landslide electoral victories in
1932 and 1934. Roosevelt's progressive politics, encapsulated in the New
Deal, advanced the values and scope of the welfare state, as a reaction to
the troubles of the Great Depression. Under Ackerman's model, this was
the signaling phase, where electoral victories illustrated national support
for Roosevelt's New Deal movement. The New Deal statutes and policies
enacted by Congress represent "proposals" of the proposal stage, where
the progressive principles and values of the New Deal movement were
concretized into policy. The first two indicia of a constitutional moment
were present.
2. Mobilized Popular Deliberation
In accordance with the mobilized popular deliberation phase, there was
institutional opposition from the United States Supreme Court. The
constitutional dilemma took form when it became clear that the activism and
interventionist welfare values of New Deal policies were incommensurable
with the existing laissez-faire jurisprudence practiced by the United States
Supreme Court." The opposition to New Deal values from the "Old Court"
(the name commonly given to the United States Supreme Court during this
time) would involve the invalidation of 184 state laws between 1899 and
1937, mainly on the grounds that they violated individual freedom or the
sanctity of property as protected under the Constitution.' The decision
that famously characterized the laissez-faire jurisprudence was Lochner 11
New Tbrk4 where the United States Supreme Court, in 1905, struck down
legislation limiting working hours as unconstitutional.48
Also in accordance with the mobilized popular deliberation phase,
these eN ents led Roosevelt to wait for another electoral mandate in 1936,
before formulating a policy to deal with the Old Court's obstructionist
judgments. In 1936, Roosevelt received another mandate. With the
weight of the American people behind him Roosevelt threatened the Old
Court with the court packing plan - that he would "pack" the court with
44 F.L. Morton. "The Politics of Rights: What Canadians Should Know About the American Bill
o" Rights" in Marian C. McKenna, ed., The Canadian and American Constitulions in comparative
Per petvv, (Calgary: Calgary Uni\ersity Press. 1993) at II I ["Morton"]. In this chapter. Professor
Morton priwides an interesting view ofthe Ne% Deal changes asa mo\ ement towards judicial restraint,
a,, -pposcd to a niunc to progrcssis\c alues.
45 Fomndationy. siqura note 5 at 63.
46 Morton, supru note 44 at 1I 2.
47, 19 s , 45 (1( 5).
4X Foundations. siqira note 5 at 63.
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appointed justices in order to overturn precedents, like Lochner, that
failed to recognize the constitutionality of New Deal policies." The bill
Roosevelt proposed to Congress stated that when a federal judge failed
to retire within six months of reaching the age of seventy, the president
would be able to appoint an additional judge to that court, to a maximum
of fifteen.
3. The "'Switch in Time " and Legal Codification
Finally, these events led to the famous "'s% itch in time" of 1937. Here,
Justice Owen Roberts of the "Old Court" made a dramatic change from
voting to invalidate a state law regulating \\ages and hours in Morehead
v New lbrk ex rel. Tipaldoi 5 in 1936 to voting to uphold such a law in
lf 'st Coast Hotel Co v. Parrish' a year later.-2 This -switch in time"
began the final stage in Ackerman's model - legal codification - where
a number of transformative decisions handed down by the United States
Supreme Court in Carolene Products," Palko : Connecticut 4, Gobitis,"
and Barnette5' would codifi' and svnthesize the principles and values of the
New Deal as constitutional doctrine.4-
While the "swvitch in time" occurred in Parrish, Ackerman says that
the problem of syinthesis is more easily identified in the case of Carolene
Products. That decision is best known for "footnote four," which has become
the most famous footnote in American constitutional law." This anomaly,
explains Ackerman, can best be understood as a rather unique form of
"inter-generational synthesis." In the decision, the main text introduced
the famous "rational basis test" where the Court held it would not strike
down commercial legislation vith a rational basis.' Ackerman states that
this is a transformative doctrinal change, but he is more interested in the
footnote.6' There, the Court peripheralized their attempt at reconciling the
rational basis test with prior doctrine by demoting protections for property
49. "Revolution," supra note 5 at 2326-2327.
50. 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
51. 300 U.S. 379 f1437).
52. See Mark Tushnet, "The Ne\% Deal Constitutional Revolution: La%. Politics, or WhatT'" (1999)
66 U. Chi. L. Re\. 1061 at 1064. This piece by Tushnet re\ iews the \%ork of Barry Cushman, one
of Ackerman's main critics, in terms of the latter's interpretation of Ne% Deal changes. Still, I think
Ackerman provides some notable responses. See "Revolution," supra note 5 at 2335-2336.
53. United States ). Carolene Prods, 3034 U.S. 144 (1938).
54. 302 U.S. 319(1937).
55. Minersville Sch. Dist, v Gobitts. 310 U.S. 5X6 (19401.
56. West a. Bd ofEduc. v Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1143).
57. "Revolution," supra note 5 at 2234-2236.
58. Foundations. supra note 5 at 119.
59. Foundations. supra note 5 at 121.
60. Foundations. supra note 5 at 1201.
61. Foundations. supra note 5 at 63.
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(emphasized in the laisse-faire jurisprudence of the previous period) but
reiterating certain fundamental rights that would attract strict scrutiny
from Courts. 62 For Ackerman, this was a clear attempt at a synthesis of
prior doctrine with new principles.
4. The New Deal Reconstruction and the Myth of Rediscovery
The "switch in time" of 1937 initiated a period of "self-conscious juridical
reconstruction of framework values.163 This period was to become the
New Deal reconstruction of constitutional values. It was not until this
year that the Old Court recognized the need to reorganize the existing
framework of laissez-faire constitutionalism for the transformative New
Deal values. What provoked this recognition? For Ackerman it was
the "conscious" recognition by the justices of the gravity of widespread
popular support (via repeated electoral victories) for the New Deal in both
the White House and Congress, coupled with the threat of Roosevelt's
Court Packing Plan. These concerns were amplified by the harsh effects
of the Great Depression and the "institutional crisis" caused by the Old
Court's obstructionist decision-making.'
Despite the fact that the Myth of Rediscovery could not adequately
account for the innovative changes of the time, Ackerman argues, legal
professionals still adhered to it:
\Vhi leall lawy ers recognize that the 1 93 Os mark the definitive constitutional
triumph of activist national government, they tell themselves a story
which denies that anything deeply creative was going on. This view of
the 1930s is obtained by imagining a Golden Age in which Chief Justice
Marshall got things right for all time by propounding a broad construction
of the national government's lawmaking authority. The period between
Reconstruction and the New Deal can then be viewed as a (complex)
story about the fall from grace- wherein most of the Justices strayed
from the path of righteousness and imposed their laissez-faire philosophy
on the nation through the pretext of constitutional interpretation... Only
Justice Robert's "'switch in time," and the departure of the worst judicial
offenders, permitted the court to expiate its countermajoritarian sins
without permanent institutional damage.65
Whereas most observers recognize the important and unique constitutional
changes of the New Deal, the professional narrative inevitably belittles
the accomplishments of the era as merely a rediscovery of the Founders'
original vision of the constitution.'
62 Foundations. supra note 5 at 128-130.
63. "Revolution." sqra note 5 at 2234
64 See 'Rexolution," wlwa note 5 at 2234-2238. See also Foundations. supra note 5 at 43-44.
65. Foundation, supra note 5 at 42-43,
66, Foundations, supro note 5 at 43,
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This view marginalizes the role of the American people whose
commitment to the progressive %alues and principles of the New Deal
eventually led the justices of the United States Supreme Court to their
"switch in time" and entrenchment of those same values." In Ackerman's
view, the actual account of the New Deal revolution has nothing to do
with "rediscovers" but is one of creation and popular influence - one that
recognizes the important role citizens had in advancing and shaping the
progressive values of the New Deal through popular support that likely
made the switch-in-time inevitable."-
While Ackerman's interpretation of these historic events is not
undisputed, his analysis of the exents of the New Deal transformations
provides an important insight into the role that popular and political forces
play in constitutional change. It is this aspect of Ackerman's theory that
will provide the focus for our investigation of the Quebec Secession
Reference and the constitutional doctrine articulated therein. As such, I
am less interested in demonstrating that the e\ ents surrounding the Quebec
Secession Reference fit perfectly into Ackerman's specific criteria than in
identifving constitutional moments. To borrow a phrase from Professor
Michael McConnell - "sometimes history trips up theory, when events
stubbornly refuse to conform to the theon we have laid out.""" Of course,
it is not surprising that constitutional development in Canada, with its own
unique stories and struggles. would not entirely follow a model of change
derived from the experiences to the south. Still, the utility of Ackerman's
framework will provide some important references along the way,
including some interesting parallels bet" een the New Deal reconstruction
and events leading up to and following the Quebec Secession Reference.
III. The Quebec Secession Reference as a Constitutional Moment
The most controversial and heralded aspect of the Quebec Secession
Reference was the Supreme Court of Canada's recognition ofa constitutional
duty to negotiate. According to the Court, this obligation, imposed on
federal and provincial governments, would follow a clear expression by
Quebecers that they wished to secede from the country.70 Given that the
terms of the reference to the Court addressed only the issue of unilateral
secession and its legality, most commentators and legal experts expected
the Court to decide that issue alone." What prompted the Court to wade
67. Foundations, supra note 5 at 43-33.
68. "Revolution,' supra note 5 at 2237-2239.
69. McConnell, supra note 33 at 115.
70. Quebec Secession Reference. supra note I at 265-267.
71. Warren Newman, Quebec Seces.smn Rlernce' The Rule of Law and the Position ofthe.lttorney
General of Canada (Toronto: York University Press, 1999) at X4-X5 l"Newman"].
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into uncharted constitutional waters'? The common answer, which will be
examined more closely later, was the political "brilliance"72 of the Court,
which understood the necessity for shaping constitutional principles to
articulate such a duty.
In contrast, I believe the real story behind the source of these new
constitutional rules is something more along the lines of what happened
with the United States Supreme Court in 1937. That is, rather than being
a creation of the Court's own political craft, in truth, the origins of these
new rules of constitutional doctrine can be traced to political and popular
forces.
Ackerman often uses the term "commitment" to describe the changes
in American constitutionalism over time, with each era characterized
by the proposal and constitutionalization of new political and popular
commitments. For example, the Reconstruction era is characterized by
a constitutional commitment to equality rights and the New Deal involved
commitment to an activist national government.74 With the help of
Ackerman's analytical framework, I will attempt to demonstrate that rather
than being a judicial creation, the new constitutional duty to negotiate was
derived from an articulated "commitment"75 to constitutional negotiations
shared by federalists and separatists, a commitment that found support
among the Canadian public.
1. Signalling and Mobilized Popular Deliberation: Canada and the
Quebec Question
Ackerman goes to great lengths to emphasize the fact that a constitutional
moment does not happen overnight. It is part of an ongoing process, usually
spanning seN eral years, culminating in national support or consensus
on important constitutional changes.76 Whether one points to the long
history of the separatist movement, the failures of the Meech Lake and
Charlottetown Accords or the referendum of 1995, there has been much
popular and political deliberation on the issue of Quebec independence in
Canadian history. In Ackerman's terms, it has long been at the "center"
72. Ibid. at X4.
73. See Ackerman's discussion at: "Revolution," supra note 5 at 2327. See also Bruce Ackerman,
"Constitutional Politics, Constitutional LaN"-( 184))99X Yale LJ. 453 at 489, 493, 517-518, 521.
74. "Revolution," supra note 5 at 2327.
75. 1 place commitment here in quotations to signify the reality that there may have been ulterior
political reasons for both the separatists and federalists to proclaim a commitment to negotiating the
terms of Quebec's separation. However. the important point fbr our purposes is that this was a stated
political commitment, one %%hich both sides held out as the policy of their respective side of the
political divide. Indeed, I am more interested in political and constitutional discourse than motives or
intentions underlying the language chosen by political parties. Hereinafter, I refer to the commitment
''ithout the quotations, but the qualifications remain.
76. "Revolution," .vupra note 5 at 2333.
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of Canadian political life. Given this reality, Ackerman's initial criteria of
"signaling" is less important in understanding the events leading up to the
Quebec Secession RcA'rencc. More relevant in this context, however, is
Ackerman's idea of the "proposal" stage.
2. The Proposal: .4 New Constitutional Politics
The "proposal" stage in Ackerman's theory involves a statement of new
constitutional politics and principles later codified and accommodated by
the present constitutional order. In the NeN\ Deal, it was the president's
widespread popular support and political mandate that ultimately convinced
the Old Court to avoid institutional crisis and ultimately accept the New
Deal policies and "proposals" and accommodate them in American
constitutional law.
There are parallels here with the Quebec Secession Reference. Like
Roosevelt and the New Deal Democrats who proposed new constitutional
politics to the Old Court, in the time leading up to the reference to the
Supreme Court of Canada, a loose but definable political discourse
developed among federalists and separatists and, with the support of the
Canadian people, a ne\\ constitutional politics was formulated and proposed.
The new constitutional politics invol ed a stated political commitment to
negotiating the terms of secession in the e ent of a separatist victory in a
Quebec referendum.
a. The "Commitinent " .4mong Separatist"
The political commitment to constitutional negotiations first figured most
prominently within the Quebec separatist movement. For separatists,
the framework for constitutional change after a positive referendum
result had, since at least the 1980s, involved a process of negotiations."
This framework was tied closely to "sovereignty association," a concept
advocated by Rend Ldvesque and other separatists.7" Underlying this was
the belief that a referendum victory wvould confer democratic legitimacy
on the separatist cause, not necessarily to effect unilateral seccession,
but to compel Ottawa finally to deal on equal terms to negotiate new
"association" between Canada an independent Quebec. Thus, Professor
Charles F. Doran writes:
[T]he separatist movement, beginning with Rene Lvesque himself, had
always argued that it would negotiate with the federal government. The
77. In 1980, Rene Ltvesque consistently held that "soereignty association" between Canada and
Quebec would have to be negotiated. Charles F. Doran, Why Canadian ni' Matters and Why
Americans Care: Democratic Pluralism At Risk (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) at 199
["Doran"].
78. Ibid. at 199.
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very notion of a 'sovereignty association' implied such a negotiation. In
a formal sense, each Quebec referendum was about the right to negotiate
with Ottawa on matters of Quebec-Ottawa relations, not unilateral
separation. 9
This commitment to negotiations was a conscious policy choice by
separatists. Though there were separatist hardliners like Jacques Parizeau,
who advocated a strict plan of unilateral secession following a referendum,
it was Lucien Bouchard's notion of a negotiated partnership with Canada
(a close relative of Ldvesque's "sovereignty-association") that came to
dominate separatist policy in the mid- to late 1990s."0 Indeed, Bouchard's
"'softer" approach to Quebec sovereignty - involving a commitment
to a partnership based on a "European model of partnership and the
preservation of Canada's economic structure"" - garnered more support
among Quebecers."2
Not surprisingly, when separatists began making concrete proposals
for secession at this time, the commitment to negotiations would play a
central role. The groundbreaking "Tripartite Agreement" of June 12, 1995
(signed by the leaders of the more prominent Quebec political parties -the
Parti Qubdcois (Parizeau), Bloc Qudb6cois (Lucien Bouchard) and Action
Democratique de Qut~bec (Mario Dumont)) provided that in the event of
separatist majority in a referendum, the Quebec government's resources
would be put towards securing sovereignty, including negotiations of a
partnership with the rest of Canada: "Insofar as the negotiations unfold
in a positive fashion, the National Assembly will declare the sovereignty
of Quebec after an agreement is reached on the partnership treaty. One of
the first acts of a sovereign Quebec will be the ratification of a partnership
treatN."" What is important to notice here is that a "partnership treaty" with
Canada would be negotiated before a declaration of sovereignty, so long as
those negotiations appeared to be "positive." Thus, separatist policy held
that success in a referendum would first trigger negotiations rather than
unilateral secession.
79, Ibid. at 199.
Xf0. R jean Pelletier, 'From Jacques Parizeau to Lucien Bouchard: A New Vision? Yes, But..." in
Har% c% Lazar, ed.. Canada The Stat of Fedcralion 1997- .on-Constitutional Renewal (Kingston:
lIn,titute of lIntergo\ernmental Relations, 1997) at 298-30f) ["Pelletier"]. Pelletier notes that even
before Bouchard became leader of' the PQ, he "-virtually imposed" this policy of partnership on
Pari/cau whilc in political collaboration with Mario Dumont.
X1. Ibd at 300t.
82. Ibd at 301,
83. As reprinted in Pierre Bicn\enu, "Secession By Constitutional Means: The Decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Quebec Secession Reference" (2001) 23 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol'y 185
at 195. ',.c also. Nc\\man, supra note 71 at 9- 10,
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But the separatists' commitment to negotiations went beyond mere
agreements. Recall Draft Bill 1. tabled by the Quebec National Assembly
in 1994. Consistent with the Tripartite Agreement, it set out a framework
for secession that contemplated negotiations following popular approval
under the heading "The Process":
I publication of the draft bill;
2 a period of intbrmation and participation for the purposes of
improving the bill and drafting the"Declaration of sovereignty"
which %% ill form the preamble to the bill;
3. discussion of the bill respecting sovereignty of Quebec, and
passage by the National AssemblN.
4. approval of the Act b\ the population in a referendum;
5. aperiodold iscuv.sion with Canada on the transitional mea. ores
to becset in place, paiticularliv as rvaigrdv the apportionment
of propert " and debuts.: during this period the new Quibec
constitution will be ifalicd.- [emphasis added]
6. the accession of Quebec Sovereignty 4
This commitment was enacted later in Bill 1..An Act respecting the future
of Quebec, at Section 26:
26. The negotiations relating to the conclusion of the partnership
treaty must not etend beyond October 30. 1996, unless the National
Assembly decides otherwise.
The proclamation of sovereignty may be made as soon as the partnership
treaty has been appro\ed b\ the National Assembly or as soon as the
latter, after requesting the opinion of the orientation and supervision
committee. has concluded that the negotiations ha\e proved fruitless."5
Thus, negotiations Aere continually contemplated as a first item in any
process to achieve secession, following a successful referendum result.
Importantly, this commitment, at least as it was articulated, involved
negotiations in good faith. The legislati\e scheme set out in Bill I calls
for treaty negotiations first, with ample statutory allowance for extensions
of the deadline to complete negotiations ("unless the National Assembly
decides otherwise") before even considering a unilateral proclamation.
Moreover, before unilateral secession is even considered, a special
committee must conclude that negotiations are "proved fruitless." In this
regard, Premier Lucien Bouchard clearly articulates the separatists' intent
to negotiate in good faith:
84. As reprinted in Ne'w man, supra note 71 at 5.
85. As reprinted in Newman, supra note 71 at 12.
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And it is only if we do not agree. after making an attempt in good faith,
that Quebec's National Assembly will, as a last resort, issue a U.D.L.
wvhile taking no steps whatsoever that would undermine our common
economic space. [.,.] But I'm quite sure that U.D.I. will never be
necessary. I have faith in the democratic nature of Canada. I have faith
in the common economic interests at stake."
The critic would respond that the call for "negotiations" was neither
a preference nor a commitment, but a form of realpolitik. That is, it was
a useful way of selling sovereignty to Quebecers, by suggesting that
secession would not cause radical change, only an opportunity for a new
equal partnership between Canada and an independent Quebec. It would
be foolish to suggest that separatist advocacy for "sovereignty-association"
and "partnership" did not have political motives. But such motives do not
change the stated nature of the policy. The commitment and policy sold
to Quebecers was that a positive referendum conferred legitimacy on a
"right" to negotiate with Ottawva, not unilateralism. Thus, even in 1995,
at the heights of its strength, the separatist push for secession from the
Canadian constitutional order articulated a commitment to negotiate in
good faith.
1. The "'Commitment" Among Federalists
The separatists were not alone in contemplating a central role for
negotiations. The federalist "commitment" to constitutional negotiations
emerged shortly after the 1995 referendum. The commitment was part of
the so-called "duality" in federalist strategy that developed in late 1995,
between "Plan A," involving steps for constitutional renewal and "Plan
B," in\ olving a plan to clarify the rules and framework of legal secession."
Federalists would turn to Plan B after Plan A failed miserably.8
8
The last gasp in the long campaign for Plan A was the attempt by
federalists to do by legislation what could not be done by formal
constitutional amendment. 9 Following the 1995 referendum, the federal
Liberals passed House of Commons resolutions that recognized a "distinct
society" in Quebec. But the resolutions failed to inspire popular support
so Transcript of a speech by Premier Bouchard to the annual meeting of the Canadian Alliance of
Manufacturers (6 October 1997) as reprinted in Newman, supra note 71 at 32-33.
87. See Robert A- Young, The Struggle For Quebec: From Referendum to Referendum? (Montreal
& Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999) at 94-96, 101-102 ("Young"], See also: Tom
Flanagan, "('anada and Quebec: Where Are We Now?" in Royal Society of Canada, Can Canada
Surn,"v' Under What Terms and Conditions? (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) at 19-27
l"Flanagan"I.
X.X Young, ibid., at 96. See also: Flanagan, ibid. at 20: Alan Cairns. "The Supreme Court, The UDI
Reference and Democracy" ( 9)NX) 19:7 Policy Options 45 [-Cairns"].
X9. See Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law f (Canada, looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 4-11
l"tlogg"].
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and only further raised the ire of Lucien Bouchard and other separatists."'
Finally, federalists understood that a new policy had to be formulated on
National Unity." This would be Plan B.
Plan B involved a momentous shift in federalist policy on several
points, including a move from talking about wh' secession should not
occur to the rules that should govern it." Professor Allen Cairns describes
the important changes in federalist polic. at this time:
Plan B was triggered by the 1995 referendum result that the "No" forces
won by a barely detectable majority. That result made the ostrich policy
previously followed by the federal go,.ernment obsolete overnight, a
(non) policy which assumed that a Quebec "Yes" was inconceivable, or
that to prepare for a "Yes" was to gi e momentum to the "Yes" forces.
"Plan B" no%% partners with "Plan A" in the federal strategy. "A" being
the evolving \ersion of the renewal of federalism to keep Quebec in
Canada which goes back to the Pearson era of the 1960s... [Plan B's]
o~erall purpose, however, is not ambiguous. One objective is to reduce
"Yes" support by indicating that a soereigntist government fresh from
a referendum victory would encounter a tough bargainer, devoted to its
own self interest, on the other side of the table... For the non-Quebec
side, "Plan B" signals an end to the almost complete lack of preparation
that characterized all go\ernments outside Quebec prior to the 1995
referendum. This is to reassure Canadians outside Quebec that they
will not be completely defenceless and unprepared should Quebecers,
b\ an acceptable majority, decide to leave Canada. Finally, "'Plan B"
is an attempt to ensure that the referendum process in Quebec is fair to
interests outside of Quebec. "
Thus, in addressing the process and rules for legitimate secession and
holding out the federal government as a tough negotiator, "Plan B"
acknowledged that secession could occur under the right conditions, such
as a clear expression from a majority of Quebecers.
This had important implications. First, by requiring a clear majority
in a referendum, federalists were implicitly recognizing an important
principle underlying the separatist movement. As noted earlier, separatists
believed that a referendum victory would confer democratic legitimacy on
their cause in order to force federalists to the negotiating table.
Second, federalists would also have to address the framework for legal
secession if such a clear majority was achieved. Here. we arrive at the
90. Ibid. See also: Young, supra note X7 at 95.
91. See Young, supra note 87 at 96 ("[Ainy positixe impact [Plan A] had in Quebec was far
outweighed by the alienation it caused in the West and by the effective criticism from the opposition.")
See also: Flanagan, supra note 87 at 20-21 ["Flanagan"]. These realities led federalists to conceive a
new approach to national unity.
92. Young. supra note 87 at 107.
93. Cairns, supra note 88 at 45-46.
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constitution and the rule of law. For, in talking about what was a legal
or legitimate secession, one must also speak of the rule of law. And the
Liberals did. As Liberal Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs St6phane
Dion noted, the rule of law was not an obstacle for change, but rather
provided a safe framework.' But what kind of "framework" would it
provide? On this point, federalists would borrow a page from separatist
political discourse.
Indeed, the constitutional framework for secession, proposed by
federalists from this point forward, wvould include a stated commitment
to negotiating secession in the event of a separatist referendum victory.
Consistent with the theory of constitutional moments, where the "proposal"
stage is identified with a clear policy statement of constitutional principle,
the federalist -proposal- would come on September 26, 1996, via a
speech by Minister of Justice Allan Rock announcing the reference of
the constitutionality of secession to the Supreme Court of Canada.9 The
speech was a clear statement of the federal government's new policy on
the Quebec question. From this point forward, the federalists would invoke
negotiations in its constitutional talk:
The Federal Government does not argue against the legitimacy of a
consultative referendum. A referendum is an opportunity fora government
to consult x ith the people. But however important it may be, the result of
a referendum does not, in and of itself, effect legal change...
[..1
In most countries the very idea of secession would be rejected. But that
has not been so in Canada. There have been two referenda in Quebec.
The leading political figures ofall our provinces and the Canadian public
hate lung agred that the country will not be held together against the
clear will of Quebecers. This government agrees with that statement.
(emphasis added]
The Position arises partly out of our traditions of tolerance and mutual
respect but also because we know instinctively that the quality and the
functioning of our democracy requires broad consent of all Canadians.
[ ... I
lfirmlv believe that we shall never reach the point of having to deal with
the realit, of Quebec X separation. But should such a day ever come,
there is no doubt that it could only be achieved through negotiation
94 Young, supra note X7 at 107.
95) Statement by the Hon. Allan Rock, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, House
of( ('immons Debates (26 September 1996) %.ol. 234, no. 75 as reprinted in Newman, supra note 71 at
27-31
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and ,agreentw. The Government of Canada believes that both our
Constitution and international law protect us against the irresponsibility
of a unilateral declaration of independence, and that is the very issue that
we shall be taking to the Supreme Court of Canada. [emphasis added]
In this respect, wie share a commitment to using negotiation and orderly
processes to work out diffitrences - something that Canadian individuals
and businesses do every dav, This commitment is what the international
community has come to expect of Canada and to admire. [emphasis
added]
Canadians' shared values have guided us in the past and wil continue to
do so in the future. All Canadians, including Quebecers. can lake pride
in the civilit ' and tolerance we have shown one another in dealing with
this findamental issue. There is ever" re-ason to believe that civility will
continue. [emphasis added]
I[...]I
Regrettably, [.. the view of the current Quebec Government on the
nature of a referendum is quite different. We ha, e, therefore, concluded
that the responsible and the effective thing to do is to submit the issue for
determination by the Supreme Court of Canada."
Here, the government openly recognized the legitimacy of the democratic
principle, in stating that Quebec could not be forced to remain in Canada
against its will. This was an important principle underlying the separatist
argument. Yet, the government went further to say that a referendum cannot
itself effect legal change. If Quebec cannot be kept in Canada against its
will, but an expression of that will cannot itself effect constitutional change
- how will secession then come about? The only possible alternative is
what the government articulates - "negotiation and agreement" to "work
out differences." In effect, the federal government's position necessitates,
by logic, a duty to negotiate, if a "clear will" to secede had been expressed.
Further, language like "mutual tolerance," "civility" and "tolerance" all
suggest a form of good faith in those negotiations. Indeed, co-counsel for
the Attorney General of Canada, Pierre Bienvenu, has recently pointed
this out:
It was mentioned earlier in this paper that it had been the policy of
the current government of Canada that "the country will not be held
together against the clear will of Quebecers". A necessary corollary of
such a policy is that the government of Canada would negotiate with the
government of Quebec if the latter were ever in a position to state that it
had a clear democratic mandate to pursue secession.'
96. Ibid
97. Bienvenu, supra note 83 at 249.
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Thus, when viewed in its proper light, this policy statement indicates
a shared political discourse with separatists on several points. First, after
years of implying that they would ignore a separatist referendum victory,
federalists finally recognize the separatist democratic principle, that there
are actual implications for a clear expression by Quebecers to leave Canada.
Second, federalists declare a "commitment" to constitutional negotiations,
an implied duty, that would follow such a "clear will" expressed by
Quebecers. Third, the federalists imply that these negotiations would
be conducted in good faith. Of course, federalists and separatists would
disagree over what a "clear will" involved as well as the details of the
process of negotiations; but in terms of constitutional discourse, these
points illustrate that federalists and separatists appeared to share at this time
a loose, but definable constitutional politics: a stated policy commitment
to negotiating the terms of secession after a clear expression by Quebec
to leave.
This analysis is important in shedding new light on our understanding
of the Quebec Secession Reference. But before moving on, it should be
noted that this policy statement indicating the new federalist political
commitments came in the speech by the federal Minister of Justice referring
the matter to the Supreme Court of Canada. While not a "threat" like the
message President Roosevelt sent to the Old Court with his court packing
plan, the federal government was clearly sending a strong message to the
Court about the new constitutional politics on the Quebec question. Given
the magnitude of the issues involved, it is not surprising that the Supreme
Court of Canada did not issue its decision until 1998. This period of time
left ample room for further popular deliberation on the proposals of the
federal government.
3. Further Mobilized Popular Deliberation
The separatists and federalists were not alone in contemplating a central
role for negotiations. The Canadian public also regarded negotiations as
a key component of any plan for constitutional renewal. As one public
opinion poll released soon after the 1995 referendum showed, there
was a clear consensus on two points: first, recognition of the discontent
in Quebec and second, widespread support for the proposition that
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"negotiations" were the appropriate solution to the Quebec question."5 In
fact, the poll showed this idea most popular within Quebec itself." Of
course, there is a difference between negotiations to accommodate Quebec
in the present constitutional framework and negotiations on the terms of
Quebec secession. However, what these polls do indicate, at least at this
stage, was that Canadians contemplated negotiations as an essential tool
in the broader project of dealing Nith the Quebec question. Indeed, further
public deliberation on the specific notion that secession, if it were to
happen, ought to be completed through constitutional negotiations, would
be an important part of the 1997 federal election.
Electoral returns are a key measure of popular deliberation and support
for initiatives. President Roosevelt and his New Deal gained strong
political momentum in the 1936 election. '\ hich awarded him a mandate to
continue with his progressive policies in forwvarding constitutional change.
Similarly, the federal government's policy on the Quebec question would
be tested in the 1997 federal election. As political scientist Robert A.
Young observed, "the whole national unity issue dominated the 1997
federal election campaign."'0°
Indeed, during the election campaign the Liberals were even more
explicit in recognizing that a secession victory in a referendum would
lead to negotiations.310 Here, institutional opposition to the proposal came
mainly from the Progressive Conservative Party, led by Jean Charest, who
repudiated any part of "Plan B," that is, seeking clarity about the rules
98. See Ipsos-Reid Research Inc.. Press Releasc -Canadians' Reaction to the Quebec Referendum"
(5 No% ember 1995). For the sake of accuracy and clarity. I ill quote directly. On the first point:
The poll finds most English-speaking Canadians "prepared to see some concessions made
to keep Quebec in Canada" - 61 percent chose this perspective compared to 32 percent
who said they would "rather see Quebec lea% e than make any concessions". This suggests
a more conciliator% outlook than the even split found the last time the Angus Reid Group
asked this question in MaN of 1994. A% ith the current findings similar to the mood that
prevailed in the couple of years prior to that sounding.
On the second point, the release states:
Asked what the federal government should now do. a plurality of 39 percent of Canadians
surxeved said they would like to see the federal government "head to the bargaining
table to try to get an agreement on changing the constitution that all provinces, including
Quebec, can agree upon". One in three (32%) opted for seeing the federal government try
to accommodate Quebec's concerns through some administrative and political changes,
while one in four (27%) said they would like to see the federal government leave these
issues alone for a while and move on to something else. The desire for moving to the
constitutional negotiating table is most acute in Quebec where 52 percent of those surv'e ted
opted for this course of action. .4cross English-speaking Canada. views were fairly evenly
split across all three options. (Question 4). [emphasis added]
99. Ibid.
100. Young. supra note 87 at I l l.
101. Young. supra note 87 at 115.
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of secession." 2 Another debate was a clash with the Reform Party who
advocated negotiating with separatists even after a narrow referendum
victory. 103
In the end, Canadians rejected the counter-proposals of the opposition
parties and re-elected the Liberals. The Liberals were handed a 155-seat
majority with only a slight decrease in their share of the popular vote
(down to 38 .40 o from 41%)."11 Moreover, the Liberals' percentage of the
popular vote was nearly twice that of its nearest opposition rivals (19.4%
for the Reform), including a share of the popular vote in Quebec roughly
equal to the Bloc Quibdcois (36.7% - Liberal, 37.9% - BQ).' ° Though
clearly not a landslide, the Liberals had faced Canadian voters and could
now claim the mantle of an electoral mandate to carry out their policies,
including the federalist strategy on the Quebec question.
Following the election, public opinion further solidified in support
of negotiating the terms of secession following a separatist referendum,
especially in Quebec. By February of 1998, a public opinion poll
released found that in Quebec 65% of respondents supported the option
of negotiations between governments rather than unilateral secession
(20%) in the event of a referendum result supporting sovereignty.0 6 These
numbers, plus the election, indicate that in the months leading up to the
Supreme Court's decision in August, 1998, there was popular support for
negotiations as the preferred means to achieve secession.
4. The Supreme Court of Canada s "Switch in Time"
According to Ackerman's theory, there is a key moment when institutional
actors, in particular courts, perform a "switch in time," finding something
as constitutionally required or sanctioned that, under existing principles,
102. bung. supra note X7 at 112-113.
103 )bung supra note 87 at 115.
104 See I 97 Canadian Federal Election Results: By province and electoral district" Online: Policy
and Analysis Division, Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, University of British
Columbia <http://esm.ubc.ca/CA97/results.html> (accessed: II September, 2005).
105. Ibid.
I Oh. See Centre For Research and Information On Canada (CRIC). News Release "New Poll On the
Reterendum Question and a UDI: Quebecers Opt for Negotiation" (20 February 1998). Again, for the
sake of accuracy and clarity, I will quote directly:
A very large majority of respondents, 76 percent, believe that the governments of Canada
and Quebec should agree on the wording of a referendum question, so that each side would
accept the result as a fair reflection of Quebecers' will. Only 13 per cent oppose ajointly-
negotiated question, while 12 percent are undecided. Among Yes voters (those who said
they Nsould vote Yes today in a referendum on sosereignty-partnership). 75 percent thought
the question should be negotiated.
A substantial majority of respondents, 65 percent, say that if the Yes side wins a future
referendum, Quebec should negotiate the terms of its departure from Canada before leaving.
Only 20 percent think Quebec should declare independence unilaterally and negotiate the
details aflei-ard. while 15 percent are undecided.
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would not be possible. This, as discussed, clearly occurred during the New
Deal in 1937. when the United States Supreme Court performed a "switch
in time" to begin the process of constitutionalizing the principles of the
New Deal. Similarly, I think the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in
the Quebec Secession Referetnce also involved a "switch in time."
The three questions that the federal government had referred to the
Supreme Court of Canada were as follows:
1. Under the Constitution of Canada, can the National Assembly,
legislature or government of Quebec effect the secession of Quebec
from Canada unilaterally?
2. Does international laN% give the National Assembly. legislature or
gov emient of Quebec the right to effect the secession of Quebec
from Canada unilaterally? In this regard. is there a right to self-
determination under international law that w ould give the National
Assembly, legislature or go\emment of Quebec the right to effect
the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally?
3. In the event of a conflict between domestic and international law
on the right of the National Assembly. legislature or government of
Quebec to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally,
wvhich would take precedence in Canada" 7
Since all three questions in the reference involved adjudication solely
on the legaliti' of unilateral secession, most commentators and legal experts
expected the Supreme Court of Canada to decide that issue alone.""
In the end, the Court went a great deal beyond that issue. After
articulating the four foundational principles - federalism, democracy,
constitutionalism and the rule of lawv and the protection of minorities - the
Court explained how these principles worked to resolve the "momentous
question" of Quebec secession. As expected, it held that legal secession
could only be done through "radical and extensive" formal amendments to
the Constitution. 109 Therefore, unilateral secession would be illegal under
the Canadian constitutional order.
But the Court did not stop there. As already noted, where the alleged
"brilliance"'"0 of the decision came was in the Court's formulation
of a "reciprocal obligation" to negotiate secession under certain
circumstances:
107. Newman, supra note 71 at 31.
108. Newman, supra note 71 at 84-85.
109. Quebec Secession Reference. supra note I at 263.
110. See New, man, supra note 71 at 84.
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The corollary of a legitimate attempt by one participant in Confederation
to seek an amendment to the Constitution is an obligation on all parties
to come to the negotiating table. The clear repudiation by the people of
Quebec of the existing constitutional order would confer legitimacy on
demands for secession, and place an obligation on the other provinces
and the federal government to acknowledge and respect that expression
of democratic will by entering into negotiations and conducting them
in accordance with the underlying constitutional principles already
discussed."'
But what conditions are required for such a "clear repudiation" to trigger
these obligations? The Court further explained:
The federalism principle, in conjunction with the democratic principle,
dictates that the clear repudiation of the existing constitutional order and
the clear expression of the desire to pursue secession by the population
of a province would give rise to a reciprocal obligation on all parties
to Confederation to negotiate constitutional changes to respond to that
desire.' 12
Hence, the Court in one paragraph accomplished two important tasks:
(1) it recognized the legitimacy of a popular expression for secession
(i.e.. as expressed in a referendum) and (2) conferred a duty of good faith
negotiations on the provincial and federal governments, in the event of
such a popular expression.
This finding was clearly unexpected - perhaps even a "switch in
time." ' " But why? To begin with an obvious point, there is nothing in the
text of the constitution that deals with secession directly or indirectly, let
alone its process. Second, in 1995 and 1996, when two courts in Quebec
addressed the issue of unilateral secession in the Bertrand Cases, neither
Justice Lesage nor Justice Pigeon mentioned or contemplated such a duty
in their decisions. In fact, both stuck mainly to the issue of legality."4
Third, neither the Attorney General of Canada nor the amicus curiae
appointed by the Court discussed such a duty in their briefs, addressing
111. Quebec Secession Reference. supra note I at 266.
112. Quebec Secession Reference, supra note I at 265.
113. I acknowledge that this could not be a perfect "switch in time" - like the New Deal Court's
sw% itch - as the Supreme Court of Canada had never addressed the issue of secession before, and thus
could perform no "switch" from previous rulings. That said, the issue had been addressed by two
justices in Quebec in 1994 and 1995 in the Bertrand cases. See footnote 114 fora discussion on this.
114 See Bertrand v Quebec (A.G.) (1996), 127 D.L.R. (4th) 408 (Que. S.C.) and Bertrand v.
Quebec (A.G.) (W)%), 138 D.L.R. (4th) 418 (Que. S.C.). The first resulted in Justice Lesage issuing
a "declaratory judgment" as to the constitutionality of the Draft Bill I, addressing the legality of
unilateral sece'ssion. The second %%as a decision by Justice Pigeon on a motion to "dismiss" lawyer
Guy Bertrand's challenge to the Bill. In both cases, the justices neither mentioned nor contemplated a
"duty to negotiate," nor did they discuss the legal importance of a separatist referendum victory. See
also Newman, supra note 71 at 12-14, 23.
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mainly the issue of unilateral secession.'I Nobody expected the Court
to go beyond the question of unilateral secession."' Finally, the Quebec
government, which had vigorously opposed the hearing from the start," 7
clearly never expected that the Court would both legitimize their position
and create an obligation on other go% ernments to recognize it."
So, the question lingers -why did the court move beyond the initial
issue oflegalit , ofunilateral secession to recognize a duty to negotiate? The
common answer to this question, in the \yords of counsel Warren Newman,
was the Court's "vision" and brilliant political craft: "'[t]he sagacity - the
brilliance, even - of the Supreme Court of Canada's judgment in the Quebec
Secession Reference lies in the Court's having had the %ision to wed the
value of constitutional legality with that of political legitimacy, and this on
several le'els."" Similarly, Professor Robin Elliot has stated: "[F]rom the
perspective of constitutional politics. the Court's reasons for judgment can
fairly be said to be a remarkable act ofjudicial statecraft, not least because
those reasons seemed to find favour with both sides of the dispute."'
20
Such views are common. To most, this new constitutional obligation was
the result of the Court's resourcefulness and astute political craft.'2 ' But
these views neglect the historical context illustrated in our analysis of
the shared constitutional politics of the federalists and separatists (with
support in popular opinion). Indeed, I would argue that appearance of the
"duty to negotiate" in the Quebec Secession Reference can be likened to
the changes brought about by the United States Supreme Court in 1937.
115. Generally speaking. the AttomeN General addressed the three questions referred to the Court,
arguing that the Constitution of Canada could accommodate any change through the use of the
amending procedures and that unilateral secession ,was illegal and inconsistent with international law.
The amtcu.% curiae, although taking a different tack, also made submissions largely with respect to
unilateral secession, arguing that domestic courts had no junsdiction as secession was a matter of pure
international law. The amicus curiae also argued that secession was a right under the international
legal principle of self-determination. No arguments were presented, by either the Attorney General.
inter% eners. or the amicus curiae on negotiations as a constitutional duty. See: M. Dawson, "'Reflections
on the Opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference" (1999) It
N.J.C.L. 5. See also Nei, man. supra note 71 at ,X4
116. Patrick J. Monahan, "The Public Policy Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Secession
Reference" (1999) I1 N.J.C.L, 65 at 66.
117. Young, supra note 8 7 at 147.
118. Though separatists w ere not entirely happy u ith the decision they certainly agreed with the
duty to negotiate. As Professor Monahan notes, following the decision the Quebec Government ran
news stories saying that the Court had set one of the "A inning conditions" for the next referendum:
Monahan, supra note 116 at 67-68.
119. See Newman, supra note 71 at 40-41.
120. Robin Elliot, "References, Structural Argumentation and the Organizing Principles of Canada's
Constitution" (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 67 at 97, n 115 ("Elliot"].
121. After examining the vast majority of the commentary on the decision, Professors Choudhry and
Howse conclude that there is widespread agreement as to the political prudence of the decision. 
See
Choudhry, supra note 3 at 144-145.
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After receiving the reference questions in 1996, the Supreme Court of
Canada was faced with a number of important realities just as the Old
Court was in the lead-up to its famous "switch in time."
First, the Court was aware that the Canadian public, including Quebec,
had rejected the Charlottetown Accord in the 1992 national referendum.
This rejection has been read by some, like Professor Hogg, as a repudiation
of the existing framework for dealing with the constitutional issues of the
Quebec question."'2 Historian Michael D. Behiels agrees: "[n]o matter
how Canadians viewed the contents of the Charlottetown deal, most
of them felt deeply that the deal was illegitimate because of the elitist,
exclusionary nature of the entire process, all-too-reminiscent of the Meech
Lake Accord."' -1 In this sense, the Canadian people had spoken: change
was needed within the legal framework of constitutional negotiations.
Certainly, a dun' to negotiate in good faith would be a change.
Second, despite the failure of Meech Lake and rejection of the
Charlottetown Accord, negotiations remained as the favourite process
among Canadians for addressing the constitutional issues of the Quebec
question. This was indicated in polls conducted following the 1995
referendum.
Third, despite the preference of some, like Jacques Parizeau, to
secede unilaterally without negotiations, separatists reaffirmed their stated
commitment that constitutional change through secession would involve
negotiations in good faith. 2 4 This was reflected, as shown, in the Tripartite
Agreement, the statements of Lucien Bouchard, as well as the numerous
legislative enactments of the Quebec National Assembly.
Fourth, the federal government had, in its shift to "Plan B" and clear
policy statement in 1996, adopted a new discourse that recognized the
salience of Quebec's popular will and a commitment, in the form of an
implied duty, to negotiate the terms of secession in the event of a separatist
referendum victory. Furthermore, the reference of three questions to the
122. Professor Hogg has argued that the rejection can be seen as a repudiation of the elitist framework
for constitutional negotiations. Where the Meech Lake agreement most likely failed because of little
public consultation, the Charlottetown Accord involved the greatest amount of public consultation of
any constitutional amendment in the history of Canada. Professor Hogg provides a persuasive reason
for this result: no matter how much public consultation occurs during constitutional talks, there must
be a crucial period of %Nheeling and dealing among first ministers to reach an agreement on a proposal
- so at the most important moment, popular participation is excluded. If he is right, and I think he
is, then the referendum results can largely be seen as a rejection of the existing formal process for
constitutional change. See: llogg, supra note 89 at 4-39, 4-40
123. Michael D. Behiels, *Charlottetown: The Anatomy of Mega-Constitutional Politics" (December
2002-January 2003) 24:1 Policy Options 65 at 66-67.
124. For clarity, I want to further emphasize that this was an articulated political commitment that may
have had underlying political motives. As noted, I am more interested in political and constitutional
discourse than motives underlying the language chosen by political parties.
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Supreme ('ourt was announced on the rei'r iay that the federal government
first articulated this new constitutional politics. Like Roosevelt's message
in the court packing plan, the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada
would have been aware of this pointed message, sent directly their way,
about the federalists' newv constitutional politics.
Fifth, the Court was aware that these Liberal federalist policies on
Quebec secession were put to the test in the 1997 election and that the
Liberals w\ere re-elected with a sizeable majority. Like the American
public in 1936, the people had spoken. Moreover, public opinion polls in
1998 indicated that popular support for the notion that negotiations were
the only legitimate process to achieve secession continued to develop in
Quebec, with 65%o of respondents stating their support.
All of this pointed to the fact that a loose but definable consensus
concerning the politics of constitutional change had developed among
the most powerful interested parties in the Quebec question. Indeed,
both the federalists and separatists indicated a commitment to good faith
negotiations of secession following a democratic expression of Quebec
to leave, and the Canadian people (as well as Quebecers) supported
that notion. To borrow a mixed metaphor from Ackerman (A la Robert
Cover and Ronald Dworkin). the constitutional nomos and narrative of
this consensus created a powerful normative or "gravitational force" on
the decision of the Court. 5 In the end. I would argue that, like the Old
Court in 1937, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized the normative
and dialogical force of the new constitutional politics and accommodated
it as a new constitutional obligation to negotiate.
in other words, there was a form of dialogical interaction where a
new constitutional politics %Nas articulated outside the courtroom, and the
Court showed deference to it, or, at least. subconsciously incorporated
those politics into its judgment. Either way, no longer would the
federalists, separatists, or the Canadian public haN e to argue or claim that
constitutional secession would or ought to involve good faith negotiations,
because their discourse had been constitutionalized. Somehow this new
constitutional requirement of good faith negotiations - articulated by the
federal government in 1996 and shaped largely outside of courts in popular
and political deliberation - found its way into constitutional doctrine.
In light of all this, to assume, as many have, that the duty to negotiate
in good faith was an example of pure juridical creation are wrong. Instead,
125. I borrow this terminology from Ackerman. who in turn borrows it from Ronaid Dworkin and
Robert Cover: See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1971) at 111-13 ("gravitational force"); Robert Cover, "The Supreme Court 1982 Term - Foreword:
Nomos and Narrative" (1983)97 Harv. L. Rev. 4 at 11-44.
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the Court was simply perceptive of events and discourse unfolding before
it. Like anyone conscious of the important debates and events occurring
in Canada at the time, the Court was affected by the popular and political
consensus for the new constitutional politics and showed deference to it
in writing its constitutional decision. The next section will examine how
the Court attempted to accommodate the new constitutional politics within
existing doctrine in what Ackerman calls the process of synthesis.
5. Legal Codification and the Problem of Synthesis
According to Ackerman, the final stage of the constitutional moment is
codification of the new constitutional politics. The toughest project facing
the United States Supreme Court after its -switch in time" was the process
of legal codification of the New Deal policies into existing constitutional
law through a process of synthesis. The problem, of course, was that the
laissez-faire constitutionalism of the previous era was clearly inconsistent
with the new interventionist values of the New Deal. Thus, the task of
synthesis would be difficult. This problem was clearly evident in cases like
Carolene Products with its use of a footnote to synthesize past principles.
So far, I have also argued that the Supreme Court ofCanada incorporated
a new constitutional politics into its decision. And, like the New Deal
court in 1937, the problem facing the Supreme Court was to reconcile it
with constitutional doctrine. However, there is nothing explicit or implied
in the Canadian constitution to guide secession. -'2 This raises the question
as to how the Court was able to justify the sudden appearance of a duty to
negotiate if no provision in the text of the constitution either recognized
it or implied it. We know this answer already - through recourse to
"'unwritten norms" articulated by the Court as "'undamental" principles
of our constitution.
But it would be inaccurate to say that the Court's use of unwritten
constitutional norms in the Quebec Secession Reference was itself a radical
change. Indeed, the Supreme Court has utilized unwritten rules in previous
constitutional cases such as the Patriation Reference and, more recently,
in New Brunswick Broadcasting'27 and the Provincial Judges Reference.'28
Despite these precedents, however, there were still important changes in
the Quebec Secession Reference.
126. Choudhry, supra note 3 at 155.
127 New Brunswick Broadcavting Co. % Nova Scia (Speaker of the House of Assembly), [1993] 1
S,C.R. 319 INew Brunswick Broadcasting].
12X. For a thoughtful discussion of the more recent decisions see Mark D. Walters, "The Common
Law C, nstitution in Canada: Return of Lc\ Non Scripta as Fundamental Law" (2001) 51 U.T.L.J. 91
at 92.
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In my view. the Court answered the challenge to reconcile the new "duty
to negotiate" with constitutional doctrine w ith a rather subtle but important
act of s vnthesis. Unlike previous structural cases dealing with unwritten
constitutional norms like the Patriation Rekrcnce": and the Provincial
Judges Reference. ,3 the Court in the Quebec Secession Reference shifted
its language to emphasize the supremacy of these unwritten norms over the
written text of the constitution and, in the process, it also expanded their
scope and application. It is this more expansive approach to unwritten
constitutional norms that provided the flexibility to constitutionalize the
new duty to negotiate.
a. Unwr-itten Constitutional .Vrmni as Supplements to the J'ritten Text
The momentous and politically charged issues often addressed in
constitutional cases bring into play questions as to the legitimacy and
institutional competence of the Court to answer such questions. This is
compounded where the Court, as it did in the Quebec Secession R,/,rence,
determines issues beyond those formally referred by the government.
Given this reality, as Professors Choudhr. and Howse point out, the Court
must provide a justification for its recourse to unwritten norms: -[t]he
Court's assertion that the Canadian Constitution contains unwritten rules
or 'principles' (terms which the Court used interchangeably, without
reference to the technical distinction between the two drawn by legal
theorists) required some sort ofjustification."' Implicit in this requirement
for a -justification" is the idea that rather than delving into unwritten
constitutionalism, the Court ought to respect the limits of the written text
of the constitution that say nothing about the legitimacy of Quebec's right
to secede, nor any duty to negotiate. That is, the Court ought to show
fidelity to the written text of the constitution. both in what it provides and
what it does not provide.
This notion of showing fidelity to the written text of the constitution
has deep roots. To begin with, a written constitution provides guidance and
certainty over time, two important components of a stable constitutional
order:
Written constitutions codify discrete exercises of deliberate self-
determination and aim to enshrine deeply held views about political
society and to impose constraints and obligations on governments.
Citizens want and expect the Constitution to endure, both as a public
symbol and as a guide and limit for political conduct... Therefore, we
tend to expect that it will not be changed, or will not be changed except
129. [1981] I S.C.R. 753 at 803 [Patrlation Reference].
130. [1997] 3 S.C.R 3 [Provincial Judges Reference].
13 1. Choudhry. supra note 3 at 154.
248 The Dalhousie Law Journal
for extraordinary reasons and with extraordinary justification. 32
Furthermore, in providing explicit textual authority for judicial
determination, a written constitution anchors the legitimacy of judicial
review. Indeed, as the authors of Canadian Constitutional Law note, one
of the possible reasons why debates about the legitimacy ofjudicial review
remained muted throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
was that lawyers and commentators more readily accepted the idea that the
Courts were showing fidelity to the text by simply interpreting it:
[T]he legitimacy issue did not dominate discussions of judicial review
under the British North America Act of 1867 in the latter part of the
nineteenth century and first part of the twentieth. This was primarily
because the legal culture then was such that those who commented on
the courts' performance in the area of constitutional law... either did not
think in terms of the legitimacy issue the way we do now or, if they did,
were less willing than commentators today to raise it. But it may also
have been because those commentators were more willing to accept that
the courts really were doing what they claimed to be doing - giving
effect to the text of that constitutional instrument. I"
But one need not examine nineteenth-century jurisprudence to find judicial
pronouncements as to the "supremacy" or primacy of the written text of
the Canadian constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed this very principle
in the Provincial Judges Reference, a case decided in 1997.
In the Provincial Judges Reference the Court found in the preamble
to the Constitution a guarantee of the independence of Provincial Courts,
though these courts, in contrast to "superior, district, and county courts"
are not referred to implicitly or explicitly either the Constitution Act,
1867 or the Constitution Act, 1982. The most controversial aspect of
the decision - the notion of constitutional protection for judicial salaries
- ultimately relied upon an unwritten norm of judicial independence
found to be - like the unwritten norms in Quebec Secession Reference - a
"foundational principle" of the Canadian constitution.'34 This unwritten
principle, according to the Chief Justice, had "grown" to include all courts,
not just superior courts."'
Still, Chief Justice Lamer made clear that these unwritten principles
would in no way usurp the "supremacy" of the written text:
132. Joel Rakan el. al., Canadian Constitutional Law, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery
Publications, 2003) at 9 ["Bakan"].
133, Mid at 3?,
134 Supra note 130 at 76.
135. Supra note 13(0 at 70,
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[T]he constitutional history of Canada can be understood, in part, as
a process of evolution "'which [has] culminated in the supremacy of a
definiti\ c w\ritten constitution". There are man\ important reasons for the
preference for a NN ritten constitution o\ cr an unwvritten one. not the least
of which is the promotion of legal certainty and through it the legitimacy
of constitutional judicial review. 11
For Chief Justice Lamer, the written text of the constitution, its stability
and the certainty it provides in the law, can ground judicial interpretation
and secure its legitimacy. Courts must return, over and over again, to the
written text to secure this legitimacy.
True to this language, Chief Justice Lamer made clear that the Court's
use and application of unwritten principles would constitute two lesser
interpretive roles: first, they may be used "to fill in gaps in the express
terms of the constitutional scheme" and, second. as an aid to construe
the provisions of the written constitution itself.'37 Thus, the "unwritten
principles" of the constitution here were mere supplements to the written
text itself, working simply as aids to its structure.
This account of unwritten constitutional norms is consistent with
the Court's approach in two earlier cases dealing with such norms, the
Patriation Reference and New Brunswick Broadcasting. In the Patriation
Reference, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of repatriation, a
situation not contemplated nor dealt with by any part of the constitution.
Though the majority found there was no legal constitutional requirement
that the federal government seek the approval of the provinces to repatriate
the constitution, it did find that Ottaw a would violate an unwritten
constitutional convention if it did not obtain "substantial" consent of the
provinces. Yet, the majority was quite clear that this unwritten "rule" was
not a part of the "law of the constitution," had no legal effects and could
not be enforced by the Courts:
The conventional rules of the constitution present one striking peculiarity.
In contradistinction to the laws of the constitution, they are not enforced
by the courts. One reason for this situation is that, unlike common law
rules, conventions are not judge-made rules, They are not based on
judicial precedents but on precedents established by the institutions of
government themselves. Nor are they in the nature of statutory commands
which it is the function and duty of the courts to obey and enforce.
Furthermore, to enforce them would mean to administer some formal
sanction when they are breached. But the legal system from which they
are distinct does not contemplate formal sanctions for their breach."'
136. Provincial Judges Reference. supra note 130 at 68.
137. Supra note 130 at 76. See also Newman, supra note 71 at 43.
138. Patriation Reference, supra note 129 at 833.
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Though the majority in Pairiation Reference affirmed a constitutional
unwritten rule, it was clear that the rule had no independent legal force.
A similarly restrained approach to unwritten norms is evident in the
Court's decision in New Brunswick Broadcasting. In that case, while the
majority relied upon an "unwritten" and "inherent" legislative privilege,
Justice McLachlin, as she then was, was quite cautious in her approach to
unwritten norms, explaining the importance of maintaining the integrity of
the written aspects of the constitutional order:
I say immediately that I share the concern of the Chief Justice that
unwritten concepts not be freely imported into a constitutional regime
Nhich has culminated in a written constitution. I note as well that there
is eminent academic support for taking a cautious approach to the
recognition of unwritten or unexpressed constitutional powers, 39
Justice McLachlin's caution implies that while "unwritten concepts"
may be defined by the courts, they should not be imported to usurp the
written components of the constitution. This is consistent with the Court's
approach to these norms in Provincial Judges Reference.
These cases provide an important insight into the Court's approach
to unwritten constitutional norms prior to its decision in the Quebec
Secession Relrence: unwritten norms are, at best, supplements to fill in
the "gaps" of the written text with no independent legal force like that of a
written constitutional provision (Provincial Judges Reference, Patriation
Refrenc'e). Furthermore, Courts must guard against importing unwritten
concepts and norms that would undermine the written components of the
constitution (.Vew Brunswick Broadcasting). As will be seen, the Court
appears to abandon this approach in the Quebec Secession Reference.
b. The Unlimited Nature of Unwritten Norms in the Quebec Secession
Reference
The Quebec Secession Reference introduces a more expansive
approach to unwritten constitutional norms. In contrast to the approach
outlined in the cases above, the Court here describes unwritten principles
of the constitution as primary or supreme and the text secondary. This is
evident in several passages:
What are those underlying principles? Our Constitution is primarily a
written one, the product of 131 years of evolution. Behind the written
word is an historical lineage stretching back through the ages, which aids
in the consideration of the underlying constitutional principles. These
principles inform and sustain the constitutional text: they are the vital
139. ,Ais Brionictk Broadcasting. supra note 127 at 376.
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unstated assumptions upon which the text is based.'
And later:
The indi idual elements of the Constitution are linked to the others,
and must be interpreted by reference to the structure of the Constitution
as a whole... certain underlying principles infuse our Constitution and
breathe life into it.' 41
And finally:
Although these underlx ing principles are not explicitly made part of the
Constitution by an\ written pro\ision. other than in some respects by
the oblique reference in the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867, it
would be impossible to conceixe of our constitutional structure without
them. The principles dictate major elements of the architecture of the
Constitution itself and are as such its lifeblood.' "
The expressive language used - that these unvritten principles
"stretching back through the ages- "breath life" into the constitution, and
are its "lifeblood" - signal that the Court is attempting to erase any doubt
as to whether the unwritten principles - not the text - are the essential
elements of Canadian constitutionalism.' Here, the written text is merely
a tangible, but limited glimpse of something greater, something much
more fundamental upon which it is based - "'\ ital" underlying principles
and assumptions. In contrast to the comments of Chief Justice Lamer
in Provincial Judges Reference, the w ritten text is no longer supreme,
but rather a frozen moment sustained by the primary architecture of the
underlying principles.
Before, unwritten principles were supplement to the written text.
According to the Supreme Court in the Provincial Judges Reference
they could, at the \ery most, "fill out gaps in the express terms of the
constitutional scheme" or be used as an aid to construe the provisions of
the written constitution itself. However, the Quebec Secession Reference
suggests that it is the NN ritten text that supplements the underlying unwritten
principles. Thus, one might be tempted to conclude with Professor Hughes,
that the express text can no longer displace the unwritten principles but
merely influence their meaning:
140. Supra note I at 247
141. Supra note I at2 4X.
142. Supra note I at 24S.
143. The use of expressive language is an effective method of clarifying previous case law that
suggested, in less expressive terms, the primacy of the text.
144, Supra note 130 at 69.
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Fundamental constitutional principles may be considered the source
of the explicit provisions which "merely elaborate those organizing
principles in the institutional apparatus they create or contemplate."
On the one hand, therefore, they are not displaced by explicit provisions.
On the other hand, their meaning may be affected by the explicit
pro% isions... "5
This vieNN - that the written text cannot displace underlying constitutional
principles, only influence their meaning - is certainly warranted based on
the aboxNc passages taken from Quebec Secession Re~frence.
But that is not all. The Court also took great pains to emphasize the
limited and particular application of the written text in contrast to the
breadth and scope of unwritten principles:
In order to endure over time, a constitution must contain a comprehensive
set of rules and principles which are capable of providing an exhaustive
legal frameNork for our system of government. Such principles and
rules emerge from an understanding of the constitutional text itself, the
historical context, and prex ious judicial interpretations of constitutional
meaning.'
Thus, the answer to the limits of the "ritten constitution in dealing with
unforeseen and complex structural issues like secession, is the limitless
nature of the underlying principles. As noted by Professor Elliot, the
unwritten principles no longer simply fill in the little gaps between the
express provisions of the constitution, but rather provide an exhaustive set
of constitutional rules to deal with numerous possible situations:
[TIhe Quchec Sece.son Rejernce... poses the greater challenge to the
legitimac. of judicial review in Canada. Not only does it suggest that
the term .gap" can be understood % ery broadly, it also suggests that the
reasoning process to be used by the courts in the filling of "gaps" can be
such as to lea, e the courts with a relatively free hand to devise such rules
as in their vieN best reflect the underlying or organizing principles of the
Constitution.'
These changes are important, for in order to accommodate the new
constitutional politics of recognition and negotiation, the unwritten
principles required independent legal force beyond the limits of the text.
The text itself said nothing about secession. Thus, the Court stated:
145 Patricia H ughes, "Recognizing Substanti% e Equality as a Foundational Constitutional Principle"
1 1999 22 l)al UJ. 5 at 15.
146. Qucbec Set cm im Rc/'rcnce. supra note I at 240.
147 ',cc Elliot, supra note 120 at 97.
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Underlying constitutional principles may in certain circumstances
gie rise to substantive legal obligations (have "full legal force", as
we described it in the Patriation Refi'rcnce. supra, at p. N45), which
constitute substantive limitations upon go~emnent action. These
principles may give rise to .er abstract and general obligations, or they
may be more specific and precise in nature. The principles are not merely
descriptive, but are also invested with a powerful normative force, and
are binding upon both courts and go\ ernments,'
Here, judicially articulated unwritten norms achieve independent legal
status, beyond the limited scope of the written text.
Many will claim that this discussion ignores certain parts of the
judgment where the Supreme Court appears to reaffirm the primacy of the
text, in particular the following passage:
In the Provincial Judges Reft'rcncc. supra. at paras. 93 and 104. we
cautioned that the recognition of these constitutional principles (the
majority opinion referred to them as "organizing principles" and
described one of them, judicial independence, as an "unwritten norm")
could not be taken as an invitation to dispense with the written text of the
Constitution. On the contrar. we confirmed that there are compelling
reasons to insist upon the primacy of our written constitution. A written
constitution promotes legal certaint\ and predictability, and it provides
a foundation and a touchstone for the eercise of constitutional judicial
re\ ie\%. I"
This passage is hard to reconcile with the other passages cited earlier. This
reiteration of the importance of the written text is best understood as an
example of the difficult process of s'nthesis itself. As demonstrated by
the footnote in Carolene Products. the process of accommodating new
constitutional principles must work against the considerable normative
weight of existing jurisprudence. Here. the Court recognizes the importance
of past jurisprudence emphasizing the primacy of the written components
of the constitution. However, the decision, as a whole, demonstrates that
the old has given way to the new: an approach to unwritten constitutional
norms more expansive than that in Patriation Reference, New Brunswick
Broadcasting, and Provincial Judges Reference.
Ackerman writes that an important role for lawyers is to use their
skills in the common law method to identify and scrutinize acts of
synthesis implemented by Courts in order to better understand the role of
constitutional development., 50 Indeed, the purpose of this section has been
to trace how the Supreme Court of Canada introduced a more expansive
148. Quebec Secession Reference, supra note I at 249,
149. Quebec Secesvion Reference, supra note I at 249,
150. Transformations. supra note 5 at 25.
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application of unwritten constitutional norms to accommodate a new
constitutional politics. Such reconciliation and accommodation within
constitutional doctrine is the final stage of the constitutional moment.
IV. The Dominant Narratives of the Quebec Secession Reference
Most scholarly work on the Quebec Secession Reference has focused
almost exclusively on the Court itself.5 ' However, if this analysis that
emphasizes the key role political consensus and popular deliberation
played in influencing the Court's decision is correct, then such judge-
centred explanations will ultimately fail in their attempts to understand
the new constitutional rules in this unprecedented decision. Still, there are
several common threads of commentary that ought to be explained.
One thread is the viewv that the decision, as a political solution was
a great success, but in terms of constitutional theory, is much more
problematic:
What were the political effects of the judgment? On this point, there
seems to be a consensus that the judgment was a success. It has been
widely accepted by political actors across the political spectrum.
Moreover, it has shaped the terms of debate in a stability-promoting
%Nav. It has eliminated extreme positions - that a yes vote would effect a
unilateral secession, or could be ignored by the federal government with
impunity.
Here, Professors Choudhry and Howse acknowledge the common
consensus about the decision's political prudence, but later note its
theoretical problems:
Thus, even from a pragmatic perspective dominated by a concern with
political effects, the question of legitimacy of the Court's decision...
deserves serious attention. And this question, especially given the
apparent no\ city and anomaly of some of the Court's holdings in this
case, can only be answered through an excursion in constitutional theory
of the kind dreaded by many academics.'
Similarly, after a sustained analysis of the decision, Professor Robin Elliot
praised the Court for its political pragmatism but included reservations
about theory:
I recognize... that the Court's balanced handling of the questions on the
basis of the four organizing principles was very likely attributable to
its sensitivity to the awkward position in which it found itself. In fact,
15 1. 'Scec Choudhry, supra note 3 at 143-144.
152 Choudliry..Ntpra note 3 at 144
153. Choudhry. supra note 3 at 145.
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from the perspectic of constitutional politic,, the Court's reasons tor
judgment can fairly be said to be a remarkable act of judicial statecraft,
not least because those reasons seemed to find favour %Nith both sides of
the dispute. Hom ever, from the standpoint o f constitutional theory, the
Court's response w as, for the reasons given, problematic." 4
These observations can be explained in relation to the process of
synthesis. What Professors Choudhry. Howse and Elliot have identified
in finding "theoretical problems" with the decision are the typical
doctrinal inconsistencies e, ident when courts accommodate newv forms of
constitutional politics. Typically, these politics are either incommensurable
with existing principles or doctrine, or difficult to reconcile with them.
Thus, the doctrinal problems identified may be the initial stages of a longer
process of synthesis that has begun with the Quebec Secession Reference.
Any long-term concerns arising from these theoretical "kinks" - such
as those largely indeterminate unwritten norms' -- will likely, according
to Ackerman, be wvorked out o\ er time as other courts continue the project
of synthesis:
Over time, a different approach to s\ nthesis comes to the fore. As the
last transformation recedes in collective experience.., a newv and more
comprehensi\e perspective on multi-generational synthesis becomes
more available. Here the Justices no longer content themselves with
salvaging fragments of the old regime: they try to integrate the new
principles added by the last transformation in the older tradition in a
comprehensive \a\. 56
In fact, this may have already begun to happen in cases like Hogan v
Attorney General of .Newfoundland.' 11ioncton City : Charlesbois5 5
and R. . .%MacKenzie'" x here the Ne\\ foundland, New Brunswick and
Nova Scotia Courts of Appeal have attempted to work out the problem
154 Elliot, supra note 120 at 97, ni 15.
155. For example, after a sustained analysis of the Court's approach to underlying constitutional
principles. Robin Elliot concluded:
[l'here is reason to beliese that it is the Quebec Secession Reference rather than the
Provincial Court Judges Cases that poses the greater challenge to the legitimacy of
judicial reviet in Canada.... Unless and until the Court is able to find a stay to avoid
these implications of its judgments in that case, that judgment not only has the potential
to inspire creative counsel to launch constitutional challenges of a kind heretofore largely
unknown in Canada - a potential that is already in the process of being realized - but
also alter in a fundamental way the manner in which we as Canadians think about our
Constitution and the roles played in determining the content of our Constitution by the
courts and legislatures respectively.
See Elliot. supra note 120 at 97.
156. Foundations, supra note 5 at 161.
157. 183 D.L.R 14th) 225 INfld. C.A.) [Hogan].
158. [2001] N.B.J. No, 4511 (N.B. C.A.) (QL) [1lon 0on].
159. [2004] N.S.J. No. 23 (N.S. C.A.)(QL) [facKenze].
256 The Dalhousie Law Journal
of unwritten norms in the Quebec Secession Reference by reaffirming, in
various ways, the primacy of the text. 16 On the other hand, the Ontario
Court of Appeal's decision in Lalonde i. Commission 6' foreshadows a
continuing role for unwritten principles in constitutional adjudication.
Another collection of commentary involves attacks on the Court for its
unprecedented decision. If my analysis is correct, then those who would
accuse the Court of "making up" the rules of secession by judicial fiat' 62
would do better to investigate the historical and political factors leading
up to the judgment. Indeed, the entire purpose of Ackerman's project of
constitutional moments has been to unearth the ways in which popular
values and political deliberation influence important constitutional changes.
The Court made nothing up. Rather, it merely perceived widespread
political consensus and popular support for the recognition of legitimacy
of popular will and good faith negotiations as constitutional obligations
and, like the Old Court, showed deference to these new articulations by
accommodating them in constitutional law.
Finally, there is a thread of commentary that praises the Supreme Court
of Canada for rediscovering certain facts or truths about the Canadian
constitution in the judgment. For example, Professors Sujit Choudhry
and Robert Howse have argued that the creation of the new constitutional
obligation (i.e., good faith negotiations) is justified as an "extension of the
internal logic of the Constitution.1'16 They do so with a tenuous distinction
betNN een "normal interpretation" and "extraordinary interpretation."'" The
distinction, ho%% ever, cannot be sustained. First, in attempting to establish
the distinction, Professors Choudhrx and Howse become confused as to
why the Court appears to treat the decision as sometimes extraordinary
and sometimes ordinary:
Again, the Court was woefully unclear, in large part because while at
some points it recognizes the extra-ordinary nature of the context, in
160. In tl, cgon, the Ne%% Brunswick Court of Appeal subsumes the unwritten principles in Quebec
Stcevson Riclkrence as merely underlying constitutional interpretation. Thus, they are, again,
supplementary to the text: Mhincton. ibid. at para.58. Similarly, in Hogan and .lacKenzie two courts
of appeal reiterate the pnmacy of the written text vis-a-vis unwritten principles.
161 2001 ) 56 0, R. (3d) 505 (Ont. C.A.). In that case, the Court quashed a decision by a government
housing Commission to close an Ontario i'ancophone hospital on the basis that it failed to give
serious %eight to the importance of the hospital to the minority francophone populaton contrary to
the unNN ritten constitutional principle of respect for and protection of minorities.
162. For example, see. D. Usher, "The ncs constitutional duty to negotiate" (1999) 20(0) Policy
Options 41, 42; Editorial, 'How the Courts Are Rewriting the Constitution,' The Globe and Mail (3
)ctcrnber 19949) A20; J. 6oldsworthy, 'The Preamble, Judicial Independence and Judicial Integrity'
(2000) 11 ( onst.Forum 60: W.H. Hurlburt, "'Fairy Tales and Living Trees: Observations on Some
Recent Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada" (I 91N) 26 Man.L.J. 181.
163. Choudhry, supra note 3 at 157.
164 Choudhrym iupra note 3 at 156-157.
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many other places it seeks to present itsjudgment as quite ordinary, rather
than ackno%% ledging that it had shifted gears into an extra-ordinary mode.
Thus, for example, at one point it stated that the duty to negotiate flowed
not from a positive referendum result that amounted to a repudiation
of the existing constitutional order, but rather from any proposals for
constitutional amendment.'
The reason, I would suggest. is that this 'extraordinary" decision was
not to be limited to one extraordinar, instance, but rather, to be applied in
cases of "normal interpretation" as Nell. Second, the distinction is deeply
problematic for normal judicial practice. Howv would lower courts apply
the distinction? Are they to ignore the Supreme Court of Canada's holding
in Quebec Secession Re/',rence as extraordinary? If this is the case, then the
Court's passages highlighting the "vital" nature of underlying principles
with independent legal force are meaningless. and thus violate the very
rule of law the\ purport to follow. The idea that the Quebec Secession
Reference is merely an illustration or extension of the internal logic of
the constitution sounds suspiciously like the Nlyth of Rediscovery, that
the Court has "rediscovered" the dutv to negotiate within the logic of the
constitution.
Similarly, on the Court's recourse to unwritten norms, Professor Mark
D. \Walters writes:
[T]he Court's effort to anchor its unwritten constitution in "ages past"
evokes the grand tradition of lex. or ius. non scripta embraced by
Coke and other se\enteenth-centur) common lawyers for whom the
constitution was based upon customs practised "time out of mind."
Unfortunately. the Court's references to this ancient legal past are
fleeting and under-examined. So too are its other historical arguments.
For example. the majority of the Court held that it was the intention of
the framers of the Constitution Act, 1867. that certain unwvritten norms be
regarded as having a fundamental and supreme status in Canadian law
- but no support is given for this remarkable interpretation of Canadian
constitutional history.'
Walters also credits the Court for rediscovering a "grand tradition"
dating back to Coke and the seventeenth century. Consistent with the
Myth of Rediscovery, Walters argues that the Court has returned to the true
origins of the common law that emphasized the unwritten norms supporting
the law. Yet, he is confused that the Court's historical arguments are so
thin on this point.
165. Choudhry, vupra note 3 at 157.
166, W alters. supra note 128 at 92-93.
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The Myth of Rediscovery is not limited to legal scholars. For example,
historian Michael D. Behiels writes:
It v ould be interesting to know if Romney's rather harsh and unfounded
criticism of the Supreme Court has changed since the Court's 1998
opinion on the Reference Re the Secession of Quebec, an opinion which is
grounded in large measure on the Justices' largely unacknowledged and
unexplained acceptance of the dual compact theories of Confederation!
Any Canadian province can now extricate itself from the Confederal
compact if it follows certain referendum procedures, acquires a clear
majority however defined, and respects in the negotiated.167
For Behiels, the Court was correct in rediscovering the truth about
Canadian Confederation - that it was a union based on compact. Yet, like
Walters, Behiels finds the Courts supposed rediscovery as "unexplained."
These are all examples of the Myth of Rediscovery that Ackerman
has pledged to demolish with his historical constitutional work. 6 Indeed,
the reason why both Behiels and Walters cannot find support for their
assessments in the reasons of the Quebec Secession Reference is because
the Court was in fact not rediscovering any truths about Canadian
constitutionalism. Instead, it was introducing new and innovative politics
into constitutional doctrine in the heat of the constitutional moment.
V. Toward a \'ew Dialogical Theory" of Constitutionalism
Today, the dominant debate concerning constitutional adjudication in
Canada focuses upon dialogical theory. Whether this theory is right or
w rong, it only includes two players: the Supreme Court of Canada and
the legislature. " One of the purposes of this paper was to advance a new
inquiry that investigates the contributions to constitutional development of
political parties, popular movements and the Canadian people themselves.
What the Quebec Secession Reference involved was a dialogical interaction
xhere ne'% constitutional commitments and politics were articulated
outside of the court, largely through political deliberation among parties,
policy changes and popular values expressed in public opinion and
electoral returns and, ultimately, the court showed deference to those new
167. Michael 1). Behil's, "Review of- Geting it Wrong: How Canadians Forgot Their Past and
Imperilled Confederation" (2001) 38 Alta. L. R. 595 at 599.
1 6X, Fmndatwns. wiupra note 5 at 44
Itf)9. For example, see Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Thornton, "Reply" to "Six Degrees of Dialogue"
I~)91i 37 0.H.L.J. 521): Christopher P. Manfredi & James B. Kelly, "Six Degrees of Dialogue: A
Rcpon'sc to logg and Bushell" (1999) 37 O.H.L.J. 513; Christopher P. Manfredi, Judicial Power
and the Charter Canada and the Paradox of Liberal Constitutionalism, 2d ed. (Toronto: Oxford
U'n:cr,,ity Press, 2001 ); Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic
DLial'ue (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001).
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commitments or, at least, consciously or subconsciously incorporated
those commitments and politics into its judgment. Thus, a new dialogical
theory of constitutionalism is required, one that also considers the role of
popular and political forces in constitutional change.
This new dialogical theory \ ould raise important normative issues. It
is one thing to describe how various popular and political forces influenced
the important doctrinal changes in the Quebec Secession Reference, but
quite another to decide whether this is a good thing for the legitimacy
and development of our constitutional order. Such concerns figure
prominently in Ackerman's work on the theory of constitutional moments.
For him, the historical role the American people have played in facilitating
constitutional change secures the legitimacy of the American system.
That is, the legitimacy of constitutional interpretation and change remains
anchored in popular sovereignty.
In many ways, the political and popular forces played a similar role
in the Quebec Secession Rctrence. That being the case, perhaps we can
follow Ackerman and conclude that the Supreme Court's decision in the
Quebec Secession Rekience helps maintain the legitimacy of the Canadian
constitutional order, being a triumph not of juridical craft, but popular
and political dialogue through the development of new constitutional
obligations outside of the courts." Of course, this is a rather simplistic
account of the normative equation. There are many who would find these
revelations troubling.II Thus, I will lea\e these complex questions for a
future day. They deserve a much more thorough treatment.
Finally, it should be said that my use of Ackerman's framework and
comparison to the Newv Deal was only one way of demonstrating the events
and political forces involved with the decision, how they influenced it, and
how the courts attempted to deal with those norms and forces within the
judgment. There are likely better ways of going about this inquiry. In
the United States, many scholars such as Sanford Levinson, Paul Brest,
Louis Fisher, and Mark Tushnet have all contributed to a significant body
of work demonstrating how constitutional meaning is developed outside
170. Perhaps this was recognized in the judgment itself. Barbara Darby has noted that for the first
time ever, the Supreme Court in Quebec Secession Reference states that it is the "people of Canada"
who ultimately have the power to amend the constitution. See B. Darby, "Amending Authors and
Constitutional Discourse" 12002) 25 Dal. L.J. 215.
171. For example, noted American constitutional scholar Laurence Tribe has found Ackerman's
advocacy for a "free-form" approach to constitutional interpretation troubling for, among others
things, failing to take the structure and text of the constitution seriously. See L. Tribe, "Taking Text
and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation" (1995)
108 Harv. L. Rev. 122 1. Canadian scholars would no doubt voice similar criticisms and more.
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of courts and how they interact with judicially articulated norms.'72 This
paper was taken up with a similar goal in mind. For if Ackerman is
right about American constitutionalism-that only an attentive historical
approach can discern the role that popular sovereignty plays in provoking
constitutional change-perhaps only when a similar investigation in
Canada is undertaken will the real stories of our experiences be revealed.
172. E.g., Sanford Levinson & Paul Brest, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking (Boston:
Little Brown, 1975); Louis Fisher, "Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress" (1985) 63
N Car. L, Rev. 707; Taking. supra note 10.
